

Linux Forensics (for Non-Linux Folks)

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What's Different About Linux?

- No registry
 - *Have to gather system info from scattered sources*
- Different file system
 - *No file creation dates (until EXT4)*
 - *Important metadata zeroed when files deleted*
- Files/data are mostly plain text
 - *Good for string searching & interpreting data*

Accessing the File System

- Can be complicated
- Encryption, RAID, Logical Volume Mgmt, ...
- Multiple partitions to mount

<http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/10/06/>

<http://deer-run.com/~hal/CEIC-dm-crypt-LVM2.pdf>

What Should We Look At?

`/etc` [%SystemRoot%/System32/config]

- *Primary system configuration directory*
- *Separate configuration files/dirs for each app*

`/var/log` [Windows event logs]

- *Security logs, application logs, etc*
- *Logs normally kept for about 4-5 weeks*

`/home/$USER` [%USERPROFILE%]

- *User data and user configuration information*

Basic System Profiling

Linux distro name/version number:

`/etc/*-release`

Installation date:

Look at dates on `/etc/ssh/ssh_host*_key` files

Computer name:

`/etc/hostname` (also log entries under `/var/log`)

IP address(es):

`/etc/hosts` (static assignments)

`/var/lib/dhclient, /var/log/*` (DHCP)

Default Time Zone

- `/etc/localtime` stores default time zone data
- Binary file format:
 - Use "zdump" on Linux
 - Look for matching file under `/usr/share/zoneinfo`

User Accounts

- Basic user data in `/etc/passwd`
Any UID 0 account has admin privs
- MD5 password hashes in `/etc/shadow`
(brute force with "John the Ripper")
- `/etc/sudoers` may indicate users w/ admin privs
- Group memberships in `/etc/group`

User Login History

- `/var/log/wtmp`
 - Shows user, source, time, and duration of login
 - Need to use Linux "last" command to view
- Other logs that may contain useful data:
 - `/var/log/auth.log`
 - `/var/log/secure`
 - `/var/log/audit/audit.log`

There's No Place Like \$HOME

- /home/<user> is common convention
- Home dir for admin user is /root
- "Hidden" files/dirs have names starting w/ "."
 - Contain app-specific configuration information
 - Sometimes executed at login
 - Possible back-door or persistence mechanism

Web Browser Artifacts

- Firefox and Chrome are common browsers
- File formats the same as Windows (SQLite DBs)
- Files under user home directories:
 - Firefox: `$HOME/.mozilla/firefox/*.default`
 - Chrome: `$HOME/.config/chromium/Default`

Nautilus

- Linux graphical file browser
- Like Windows Explorer
- Thumbnails: `$HOME/.thumbnails`
- Recent files: `$HOME/.recently-used.xbel`

Command History

- `$HOME/.bash_history`
- Unfortunately not time-stamped by default
- Can be modified/removed by user

- Sudo history in:
 - `/var/log/auth.log`
 - `/var/log/sudo.log`

SSH

- Standard remote access/file xfer mechanism
- Useful files in `$HOME/.ssh`:
 - known_hosts – hosts user connected to from here
 - authorized_keys – public keys used for logins to here
 - id_rsa – private keys used to log in elsewhere

Things to Watch Out For

- Persistence mechanisms
- Back doors
- Other suspicious files and directories

Persistence Mechanisms

- Service start-up scripts
 - `/etc/inittab, /etc/init.d, /etc/rc.d` (traditional)
 - `/etc/init.conf, /etc/init` (Upstart)
- Scheduled tasks ("cron jobs")
 - `/etc/cron*`
 - `/var/spool/cron/*`

Back Doors

- Deliberate malware/Trojan horse installs
- In `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow`:
 - Extra UID 0 accounts
 - "Application" accounts with active passwords
- New `$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys` entries
- Back doors via `[x]inetd`
 - `/etc/inetd.conf`
 - `/etc/xinetd.conf, /etc/xinetd.d`

Also Watch Out For...

- Rogue "set-UID" files
- Directories w/ names that start with "."
- Regular files under /dev directory
- Recently modified files
- Large files

Wrapping Up

- Any final questions?
- Thanks for listening!

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